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Abstract
The literature on North-South trade has explored conditions under which international
trade might be a factor magnifying income disparities between the advanced North and the
backward South. Little attention has yet been placed on the e¤ect of trade on countries that
do not display substantial dissimilarities concerning capital endowments. We show that even
when no single country is technologically more advanced than any other one and productivity
changes are uniform and identical in all countries, international trade may still be a source
of income divergence. Income divergence will be experienced when comparative advantages
induce patterns of specialisation that, although optimal for each country at some initial
point in time, do not o¤er the same scope for improvements in terms of subsequent quality
upgrading of nal products.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades a number of articles on international trade have started to acknowledge
the importance of using non-homothetic preferences to capture some relevant features of North-
South trade e.g., Matsuyama (2000), Flam and Helpman (1987), and Stokey (1991). These
papers have developed tractable models that predict patterns of specialisation where richer
countries produce and export goods with high income demand elasticity. One of the main
predictions of those models is that the impact of international trade on growth may be uneven
across countries which are at di¤erent stages in the process of development. More precisely, trade
would tend to be more benecial to developed economies, and it may even be detrimental to
underdeveloped countries. The key mechanism at work is the one originally argued by Prebisch
(1950) and Singer (1950): as the world income rises, world aggregate demand deviates towards
the goods produced by richer economies (the North), improving their terms of trade and, thereby,
magnifying initial income disparities between South and North.
The papers mentioned above thus restrict the attention to a world economy where some
countries (the North) have somehow historically accumulated larger amounts of human and
physical capital than others (the South), and show conditions under which trade magnies initial
income disparities resulting from those capital di¤erences. However, the pattern of international
specialisation and trade might also be the source of income di¤erentials between countries that
do not display any substantial dissimilarity regarding their levels of human and physical capital.
In this paper, we look at economies that start o¤with similar capital endowments, and propose a
theory of uneven growth induced by trade, based on non-homothetic preferences and productive
specialisation driven by comparative advantages.
Our theory rests on ve fundamental elements. First, there exists a large variety of con-
sumption goods in the economy. Second, each variety of consumption goods is present in several
degrees of quality, with higher qualities being increasingly costly to produce. Third, some va-
rieties o¤er larger scope for quality upgrading than others, in the sense that it is easier to
increase their quality. Fourth, individuals care about the quality of the goods they consume
and, moreover, their willingness to pay for higher quality of consumption increases with their
income. Fifth, countries which are similar in terms of their average productivities specialise in
the production of di¤erent varieties of goods according to their comparative advantages.
The rst four elements above give room for non-homothetic demand schedules, where the
income demand elasticity of di¤erent varieties of goods is tied to the specic degree of quality
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in which each particular variety is (optimally) traded in the market. The last element yields
patterns of regional specialisation that, combined with non-homothetic demand schedules, may
lead to divergent dynamics among countries that are initially similar in terms of capital endow-
ments. In such a framework, we show that international trade may induce income divergence
across countries characterised by similar initial income levels and with no absolute advantages
over one another. In particular, income divergence will be experienced when comparative ad-
vantages dictate patterns of specialisation that, although optimal for each specic country at
a given point in time, do not o¤er the same scope for technological improvements in terms of
subsequent quality upgrading of nal goods.
To convey some preliminary intuition of how non-homothetic demand schedules arise as an
equilibrium result of our model, it is worth discussing in further detail some of the specicities
of the commodity space. In that respect, we follow the quality ladder structure featured in
Grossman and Helpman (1991) that is, in a continuum of horizontally di¤erentiated varieties
of goods, an innite number of qualities for each variety are available in the market. Our
commodity space is thus bidimensional, with the horizontal axis indexing the variety of the
good and the vertical axis indexing the quality level of a specic variety. Unlike Grossman-
Helpman, however, in our framework the optimal expenditure shares across varieties do not
remain constant as income changes. In particular, we postulate that the additional utility the
individual derives from a marginal increase in the quality of the goods he consumes increases
with the quantity of consumption, hence with the individuals income (in other words, the
individuals taste for quality increases with his income). As a result, as individuals become
richer they will optimally shift resources towards those varieties whose quality can be set at
relatively higher levels. The budget constraint, in turn, implies that the extent by which quality
can be raised for any given variety is related to its specic cost of quality upgrading. Thus,
the distribution of quality upgrading across varieties results from the interaction between the
underlying technological structure and the response of the consumerstaste for quality to income
variations. If the cost of quality upgrading di¤ers across varieties, then the shift towards higher-
quality goods with rising income will (optimally) occur at di¤erent speeds across varieties. More
precisely, the lower the cost of quality upgrading for a specic variety, the faster the speed of
quality upgrading for this variety. This uneven climbing-up-the-quality-ladder will in turn lead
to non-homothetic demand schedules, where the fraction of income spent in di¤erent varieties
depends on the level of income.
When we introduce this interaction between quality upgrading and comparative advantages
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into a general equilibrium model of international trade, we show that it may lead to income
divergence through its e¤ect on the terms of trade. To briey characterise this mechanism, take
some hypothetical country (call it country Z) that specialises in the production of a variety v,
which exhibits high cost of quality upgrading.1 According to the mechanism proposed in this
paper, quality upgrading for variety v will be relatively slow as world income grows. Hence, the
world expenditure share on v will decrease over time. As a result, as the world income rises, Z
will experience a decline in its terms of trade, because the types of goods it produces display
low income demand elasticity.
Our model predicts that the richer economies are those that specialise in the production
of varieties of goods that exhibit larger scope for quality upgrading (in turn, implying that
they specialise in the production of higher-quality goods). This prediction is conrmed by the
data, as shown in Khandelwal (2008). That paper estimates the length of quality ladders for
di¤erent industries, showing that import penetration from poorer economies in the US is lower
in industries that exhibit longer quality ladders (hence larger scope for quality upgrading), while
exports to the US originating from other developed economies tend to belong precisely to those
industries and, in particular, to the upper spectrum of their respective (long) quality ladders.2
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates an historical example. Section
3 describes the set-up of the model. Section 4 solves the consumers problem in a partial
equilibrium set-up, illustrating the specicities of the non-homotheticity of demand in our model.
Section 5 computes the general equilibrium in the world economy, and analyses the e¤ects of
uniform aggregate productivity growth. Section 6 extends the comparative statics exercises
to account for changes in the individual skills heterogeneity and population growth. Section 7
concludes. The appendices contain the omitted proofs and some additional algebraic derivations
used in the main text.
1This specialisation decision might be related, for instance, to geographical conditions inuencing the tech-
nology available in Z . The example in the next section will illustrate this point in further detail.
2Schott (2004) also shows that the quality dimension within varieties of goods (measured in his paper by unit
values) is key to understand trade patterns in the world economy. In particular, he provides evidence that US
import unit values correlate positively with the exporters GDP per head. Moreover, this positive correlation
tends to be more pronounced for varieties that exhibit larger scope for quality upgrading (e.g., manufactured
goods) compared to more homogeneous goods (e.g., natural resources goods). See also Hallak (2006) for related
evidence.
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2 An Illustrative Historical Example colonial Jamaica and pre-
industrial Argentina
Situations where the mechanism proposed in this paper may have played an important role
include the cases of economies for which exogenous initial geographical conditions greatly inu-
enced their specialisation in the world economy during some period in history. As an illustrative
example, we take the case of colonial Jamaica and compare it to the one of pre-industrial Ar-
gentina.
From the second half of the XVII century until the rst half of the XIX century, the Jamaican
economy grew mainly based on the production and export of sugar from sugarcane. This is not
surprising given the excellent climatic conditions this tropical island o¤ered for that type of
crop. By 1805, Jamaica was the largest sugar exporter in the world (Higman, 2005). Given
the value attributed to sugar by European consumers, during that period Jamaica was deemed
probably the most important British colony in the Americas (Hall, 1959). Although sugar was
indeed a very valuable consumption good at that time, it clearly was a type of good with very
limited scope for undergoing subsequent improvements in quality. As such, according to our
model, sugar was bound to eventually lose its status of luxury among consumers. In fact, by
the second half of the XIX century, sugar began to lose its economic preeminence in the world
markets and started experiencing a long phase of declining prices.
In Argentina, geographical conditions made this country exceptionally apt for the breeding
of cattle and growing cereals, which constituted the main engines of its economy until 1920.
The commercial production of cattle started in the late second half of the XVIII century with
the appearance of the saladeros slaughterhouses where meat would be cured by drying and
salting. Salt-cured beef was a rather unsophisticated product that was mostly exported to Cuba
and Brazil to feed slaves. In fact, the industry of the saladeros did not mean a big push to the
Argentinean economy, which was at that time still a very marginal country within the world
economy.
The big boom for the cattle industry in Argentina came much later, at the end of the XIX
century. Unlike the sugar industry, the cattle industry had some scope for quality upgrading, in
the form of chilled and frozen beef. The market size for this product, certainly more appreciated
by consumers than salt-cured beef, was however initially quite limited, since the transportation
cost induced a huge di¤erential in the prices of the two goods. Yet, in Europe, income had been
continuously rising during the XIX century, thanks to the massive technological advancement
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that followed the advent of the Industrial Revolution. The availability of a higher-quality good in
the cattle industry eventually attracted well-to-do European consumers, whose demand induced
Argentinean rms to export large amounts of chilled and frozen beef to Europe.3 During this
period, Argentina grew on average at rate of 5% yearly, attracted millions of immigrants from
Europe and became one of the richest countries in the world.4 The exportation of chilled and
frozen beef was undoubtedly one of the main activities that spurred this phase of fast and steady
economic growth in Argentina between 1880-1920.
This example illustrates how exogenous geographical conditions greatly inuenced the path
of GDP growth in Jamaica and in Argentina via the evolution of their exports, in the way our
model would predict. Jamaica was comparatively e¢ cient at producing sugar, while Argentina
enjoyed a comparative advantage in beef production. Sugar o¤ered very limited scope for quality
improvements, which is analogous to assuming that the cost of quality upgrading for sugar
products is extremely high. On the contrary, beef did o¤er a lot more scope for quality upgrading
than sugar, which materialised in the switch from salt-cured beef production (lower-quality good)
to chilled and frozen beef (higher-quality good). As predicted by our model, sugar exports
initially sustained high growth in Jamaica, until rising income in the world shifted aggregate
demand towards varieties of goods which could be o¤ered in higher quality degrees, such as
chilled and frozen beef from Argentina.
The previous example also points out an important feature of our model. Quality upgrading
is a phenomenon that occurs within industries, and (possibly) heterogeneously across di¤erent
industries. This feature, which contrasts with models that take luxuries as an exogenous category
(e.g., models with hierarchical or 0/1preferences), allows our model to account for both the
initial di¤erence in GDP per capita between the two countries and the following catching-up
(and overtaking) by Argentina relative to Jamaica.5
3The main market for Argentinean chilled and frozen beef at that time was by far the prosperous Great
Britain of end of XIX and beginning of XX century (in 1914, 83.5% of the total Argentinean exports of chilled
and frozen beef was sent to the UK). See Rapaport (1988).
4By 1913, the GDP per head in Argentina was similar to that of France and Germany see Blanchard and
Perez Enrri (2002).
5Further details on hierarchical preferences can be found in Bertola, Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006, pp. 302-
320). The 0/1specication of preferences is due to Foellmi, Hepenstrick and Zweimuller (2008).
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3 Structure of the Model
We consider a world composed by two countries: the Home country and the Foreign country. For
brevity, hereafter we refer to the former as H and to the latter as F. These two economies share a
common commodity space, dened along two distinct dimensions: horizontal and vertical. The
rst dimension (horizontal) designates the variety of the good e.g., fruit products, TV, etc.
Di¤erent varieties are indexed by the letter v along the variety space V  R : v 2 [0; 1]. The
second dimension (vertical) refers to the intrinsic quality of the good of a particular variety v
e.g., organic vs. non-organic fruit products, LCD TV vs. cathode ray tube TV, etc. Within
each variety v 2 V, commodities are vertically ordered by the quality-index q belonging to the
set Q  R : q 2 [1;1), where a higher q denotes a higher quality level. The commodity space
is then given by the set VQ = [0; 1]  [1;1), and each commodity is identied by a pair
(v; q) 2 VQ.6
We assume that all commodities are tradable. Additionally, we assume there are no transport
cost and no tari¤s a¤ecting international trade.
3.1 Preferences and Budget Constraint
Both H and F are inhabited by a continuum of individuals with identical preferences dened
over the commodity space VQ. Whenever it proves needed, hereafter we adopt the following
notation: unstarred symbols refer to H, starred ones to F.
Denote by xvq 2 R+ the consumed quantity of commodity (v; q) 2 VQ (i.e., the consumed
quantity of variety v in quality q) by a representative individual from H. His preferences are
summarised by the following utility function:
U =
Z
V
ln
Z
Q
Cvqdq

dv
with Cvq =
8<: xvq if xvq < 1(xvq)q if xvq  1
(1)
where Cvq represents a quality-adjusted consumption index.
6 In our setup, di¤erent varieties should be then understood as groups of commodities that aim at satisfying
di¤erent needs. On the other hand, di¤erent qualities for a particular variety refer to the extent (or degree)
in which the need is actually satised by the commodity. In that regard, food satises a di¤erent need when
compared to TVs (physiological nutrition vs. visual entertainment), but an LCD TV satises the need for visual
entertainment (objectively!) better than a cathode ray tube TV.
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The utility function captures the notion that quality is a desirable feature. To this aim, (1)
is specied in such a way that quality is never bad. In particular, quality magnies the utility
derived from (physical) consumption only when xvq > 1. This last property of (1) intends to
capture the idea that individuals rst seek to satisfy their basic consumption needs, and just
after these basic needs are met, do they start paying attention to the quality dimension of the
goods they consume.
Some additional properties about the utility function specied in (1) are worth noting. First,
within each variety v, marginal utility is unbounded above as consumption approaches zero,
implying that all varieties will be actively consumed in an optimum. Second, convexity in
quantities of the inner integrals of U means that individuals will optimally consume only one
type of quality for each variety v. Third, considering two di¤erent levels of the quality-index
q < q for the same variety v, the marginal rate of substitution of xvq for xvq is non-decreasing
along a proportional expansion path of xvq and xvq.7 This last property of (1) will allow demand
functions to display non-homothetic behaviour, where the rich spend a larger fraction of their
income in high-qualities than the poor.8
Each individual is endowed with one unit of e¤ective labour, which is supplied inelastically.
Labour is immobile across countries. As a result, each individual in H supplies his entire labour
endowment to domestic rms in return of a wage w 2 R++ (hereafter, all prices are measured
in a common numeraire). This wage represents the only source of income for the individual.
Therefore, his budget constraint reads as follows:Z
V
Z
Q
pvq xvq dq dv  w (2)
where pvq 2 R++ denotes the (international) price of each unit of commodity (v; q) 2 VQ.
7To see this, note theMRS(xvq; xvq) is dened by (@U=@xvq)(@U=@xvq), and along a proportional expansion
path xvq = k xvq, where k > 0. Then, for xvq; xvq > 1:
MRS(k xvq; xvq) =
q
q
kq 1
 
xvq
q q
;
from where it is clear that, along the ray xvq = k xvq; MRS(xvq; xvq) is increasing in xvq.
8A crucial assumption for our model is that quality upgrading is increasingly appreciated by the consumer
as he turns richer, as captured by (1). An alternative utility specication that would still exhibit that feature
and work for our model would have the quality-adjusted consumption index: Cvq = (1 + xvq)
1+q, where xvq  0
and q  0. In particular, the main partial equilibrium result, that is Corollary 1 ahead in the text, would still
hold under this specication (a formal proof is available from the authors upon request). In turn, all the general
equilibrium results presented later on in Sections 5 and 6 would hold as well. The ultimate reason for choosing
the specication in (1) is essentially motivated by algebraic tractability.
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We dene v  w 1
R
Q pvq xvq dq as the demand intensity of variety v 2 V.9 In the optimum,
given the specication in (1), the budget constraint (2) will naturally bind. It is thus straight-
forward to notice that demand intensities will sum up to one across varieties (i.e.,
R
V vdv = 1).
All individuals in the world face the same prices for the reproducible commodities. As a
result, the analogous expressions in (1) and (2) corresponding to F read, respectively, as follows:
U =
R
V ln
hR
Qmax

xvq;
 
xvq
q	
dq
i
dv and
R
V
R
Q pvqx

vqdqdv  w; where w denotes the wage
in F in terms of the common numeraire (clearly, since labour is immobile, w and w need not
be equal).
3.2 Technology
In both countries competitive rms produce commodities based on linear production functions
in which labour represents their only input. We let unit labour requirements vary both across
varieties and across qualities of each variety. Also, we let unit labour requirements di¤er across
countries. In particular, in H the unit labour requirement for commodity (v; q) 2 VQ is
given by cvq = a (v) q(v)=, while in F is given by cvq = a (v) q(v)=; where  > 0 denotes a
world aggregate-productivity parameter, a (v) and a (v) represent variety-specic technological
parameters which may di¤er between countries, and (v) summarises the cost elasticity of quality
upgrading for each variety v which is assumed to be the same for H and F. We suppose that
a (v) : [0; 1] ! R++, where a0 ()  0; analogously, a (v) : [0; 1] ! R++, where a0 ()  0. We
also assume that  (v) : [0; 1]! R++, where 0 () > 0 and  (0) > 1.10
The next assumption dictates the pattern of comparative advantages across countries.
Assumption 1 Let A (v)  a (v) =a (v). We suppose: A (0:5) = 1 and A0 (v) < 0.
Assumption 1 represents the only source of heterogeneity across countries in our model. In
particular, this last assumption implies that H enjoys a comparative advantage in the production
9Demand intensities are the continuous counterpart of the discrete-case expenditure shares. Their relationship
is analogous to that between densities and discrete probabilities. We borrow this nomenclature from Horvath
(2000).
10From the labour requirements functions it is apparent that qualitative upgrade is costly, which seems a
natural assumption to make. Additionally, from our assumptions it follows that  (v) > 1 for all v 2 V, which
implies that the marginal cost of improving quality is, for each variety, increasing along the quality space. In
that sense, this assumption also seems quite natural, as it reects the fact that subsequent quality improvements
become increasingly costly. Finally, note that 0 () > 0 coupled with a0 ()  0implies that varieties are sorted
by their cost of quality upgrading.
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of lower-indexed commodities, while F has a comparative advantage in the production of upper-
indexed commodities.11
Note that given the cost functions cvq and cvq specied above, we are allowing countries to
possibly display identical income per head in equilibrium, since we are not imposing any direct
source of absolute advantage in the model. Furthermore, notice that because  (v) is the same
for H and F, the nature of the comparative advantages does not change as we move up in the
quality ladder. In that sense, in the model comparative advantages always refer to particular
varieties of goods, irrespective of the quality at which this variety is actually produced (for
example, a country that has a comparative advantage in producing fruit products, will have this
advantage both in organic and in non-organic fruit products).
In our world economy, each country will naturally specialise in those commodities which they
can produce more cheaply. As a result, the international price of each commodity will be given
by pvq = min

cvqw; c

vqw
	. Given Assumptions 1, we can write the international price of each
commodity (v; q) 2 VQ as follows:
pvq = 
 1 (v) q(v); (3)
where  (v)  min fa (v)w; a (v)wg. In addition, from (3), the marginal variety m (that is,
the variety that can be produced by both countries at the same cost) satises:
A (m) = w=w: (4)
Equation (4) implies that, given the relative wage w=w, H will produce all the varieties in the
interval [0;m] and F will produce all the varieties within [m; 1].
4 The Individuals Optimal Consumption Choice
In this section we present the optimal consumption choice of a representative individual from
H, given the set of prices in the world economy. The results so obtained can be easily extended
to an individual from F, which is done in Appendix B.
An individual from H chooses the quantities xvq 2 R+ to consume of each commodity
(v; q) 2 VQ to solve the following problem:
11Assumption 1 is standard in the international trade literature of Ricardian tradition. Letting  () vary across
countries change in a similar fashion as a () would not qualitatively alter the results of the paper in fact, adding
heterogeneity on  (), on top of that on a (), would reinforce our ndings.
10
max
fxvqg(v;q)2VQ
U =
Z
V
ln
Z
Q
max fxvq; (xvq)qg dq

dv;
subject to:
R
V vdv = 1;
v = w
 1
Z
Q
pvqxvqdq; 8v 2 V
pvq = 
 1 (v) q(v); 8 (v; q) 2 VQ:
(5)
In order to solve the consumers optimisation problem (5), it proves convenient to state the
following preliminary results.
Lemma 1 (Preliminary Results)
(i) For each variety v 2 V, at most one quality, denoted henceforth by qv 2 Q, is consumed in
strictly positive amount in an optimum; formally: xvqv  0, xvq = 0, 8q 6= qv.
(ii) Take xvqv , 8v 2 V. Then: qv > 1 ) xvqv > 1:
Proof. See Appendix C.
From Lemma 1, Part (i), it immediately follows that the income devoted to purchasing
commodities of variety v is entirely spent on quality qv. Hence, for each v 2 V the consumed
quantity of the optimal quality qv, is given by xvqv = vw=pvqv . In addition, if we also consider
Part (ii), it follows that we may replace the inner integral
R
Qmax

xvq;
 
xvq
q	
dq in (5) by the
simpler expression
 
xvqv
qv , without altering any of the nal results of that problem.12
Given Lemma 1 the individuals optimisation problem in (5) can be thus restated in a simpler
form in terms of two sets of control variables fv; qvgv2V replacing the set of physical quantities
fxvqg(v;q)2VQ. In particular, (5) can be restated in the following reduced-form:
max
fqv ;vgv2V
U =
Z
V
qv ln

wv
pvqv

dv;
subject to:
Z
V
vdv = 1;
qv  1; 8v 2 V;
pvqv = 
 1 (v) q(v)v ; 8v 2 V:
(6)
12To see this more clearly, notice that (keeping in mind the physical constraint xvq > 0) xvqv < (xvqv )
qv if and
only if xvqv < 1 and qv > 1, which according to Lemma 1, Part (ii), cannot be true.
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The rst-order conditions corresponding to (6) are stated in the Appendix A. From those
rst-order conditions we may obtain the following expression for each v in the optimum:
v =
qv
Q
; 8v 2 V: (7)
where Q  RV qzdz can be regarded as an aggregate index measuring the optimal consumption
bundles average quality. Notice that, according to (7), the fraction of income spent on variety
v is determined by its optimal quality relative to the average quality of consumption. In that
regard, if all varieties were optimally consumed at identical quality degrees (i.e., if qv = Q,
8v 2 V), then v = 1 would hold for all v 2 V, and our model would behave exactly as the one
by Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977).
4.1 Distribution of Qualities and Demand Intensities across Varieties
Given the technology in the world economy summarised by ;  () and  ()it is possible to
characterise the distribution of the optimal qualities across varieties according to their position
within the set V. Lemma 2 provides the rst result in that direction.
Lemma 2
Consider two varieties v; v 2 V, such that v < v. Then: qv  qv, with strict inequality if and
only if qv > 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 2, implies that the consumed quality qv is non-increasing in the variety-index v. The
underlying intuition for Lemma 2 is straightforward those varieties which can be more cheaply
upgraded tend to be optimally consumed in higher quality levels.
The monotonicity of qv implied by Lemma 2 allows us to split the variety space in two
disjoint subsets. The rst subset containing varieties that are bound to be consumed at the
baseline quality level (i.e. with qv = 1) these are the higher-indexed varieties. The second one
comprising the varieties for which the constraint qv  1 in (6) does not bind  these are the
lower-indexed varieties. Let us denote by L  V the latter subset.
Denition 1 Let L = fv 2 V : v = 0g, where v is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the
constraint qv  1.
Remark 1 Both L = ; and L = V are in principle possible. In fact, L = ; will hold if  is
su¢ ciently small, while L = V will hold if  is su¢ ciently large. (See Lemma 3 ahead.)
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Lastly, regarding the distribution of the demand intensities, from the condition in (7) we can
observe that, in the optimum, demand intensities are set proportional to the optimal qualities.
As a result, the distribution of v across varieties will qualitatively mirror that one of qv.
4.2 E¤ects of Aggregate Productivity Shocks on Demand
When the technology is subject to changes, both substitution-e¤ects (due to adjustments in
relative prices) and income-e¤ects (due to the overall e¤ect of variations in productivity) arise.
Here we focus our attention solely on income-e¤ects. In order to isolate income-e¤ects from
substitution-e¤ects, we let the parameter  vary, while we keep constant the functions a (),
a () and  ().
Lemma 3
Let   a (0) exp [ (0)]. Then:
(i) for all  2 (0; ) : L = ;;
(ii) for all    : L = [0; ~v()], where ~v() : [;1)! [0; 1], ~v() = 0, and ~v0 () > 0 whenever
~v () < 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
In short, Lemma 3 implies that the subset of varieties consumed at the baseline quality
level initially comprises the entire set V, and eventually starts narrowing as world aggregate
productivity increases beyond the threshold . The next lemma describes in further detail how
optimal qualities evolve as the parameter  changes.
Lemma 4
i) If  2 (0; ): @qv=@ = 0 for all v 2 V;
ii) If   : a) for all v 2 L, @qv=@ > 0; b) for all v =2 L, @qv=@ = 0; c) for all v; v 2 V, such
that v < v, @qv=@  @qv=@, with strict inequality if and only if v 2 L.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 4 shows that, for all varieties belonging to L, quality increases when the aggregate
productivity in the world rises. Furthermore, this e¤ect is stronger for those varieties whose
quality can be more cheaply upgraded i.e., those varieties carrying a lower  (v). On the other
hand, we can observe that the optimal quality of varieties that do not belong to L does not
respond to (innitesimal!) changes in .
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Based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we can accordingly identify two distinct regimes depending
on the level of  that prevails. First, we refer to an economy such that    as a subsistence
economy  in a subsistence economy all varieties are consumed at the baseline quality level.
Second, we refer to an economy with  >  as a modern economy in a modern economy some
varieties (and possibly all of them) are consumed strictly above the baseline quality level. In
what follows we proceed to further characterise these two regimes.
Subsistence Economy:   
In this regime qv = 1 holds for all v 2 V. This in turn means that Q = 1 and v = 1must hold for
all v 2 V as well. Thus, in a subsistence economy demand intensities remain constant and equal
to one for all varieties as  increases.13 In that regard, a subsistence economy displays analogous
behaviour to the economy discussed in Dornbusch et al (1977), where demand schedules are
homothetic.
Modern Economy:  > 
This regime is characterised by qv > 1 for all v 2 [0; ~v()). Hence, the average quality can be
written as Q = 1 ~v ()+R ~v()0 qz dz, from where it follows that @Q=@ = R ~v()0 (@qz=@) dz > 0.
Since @qv=@ = 0 for all v =2 L, then because of (7), @v=@ < 0 must hold for all v =2 L. As
a result, given that
R
V v dv = 1, it must thus be the case that the demand intensities of some
(and possibly all) v 2 L will increase as  rises. Let J  V denote the subset of V comprising
all those varieties for which @v=@ > 0.
Denition 2 Let J = fv 2 V : @v=@ > 0g.
In a subsistence economy J = ;, while in a modern economy J 6= ;. In other words, in
a modern economy the homotheticity of demand intensities no longer holds, as a subset of
varieties whose income demand elasticity is larger than one shows up. Notice nally that J  L,
since @qv=@ > 0 is a necessary condition for @v=@ > 0 to hold.
The next proposition further characterises the behaviour of the demand intensity v of a
generic variety v, in relation to those of the other varieties, as  rises.
13 It must be noted that this result applies only if    holds after performing the comparative statics exercise.
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Proposition 1
Consider any two varieties v; v 2 V, such that v < v. Then:
i) If v 2 J: @v=@ > @v=@;
ii) If v =2 J: @v=@  0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
To interpret our previous results more clearly, notice that J may be understood as the set of
luxury goods, where by luxury goods we refer to those varieties whose income demand elasticity
is larger than 1. Since the set J always comprises lower-indexed varieties, the luxury goods
are exactly those varieties whose quality degree qv is relatively high compared to the average
quality Q: In that sense, in our model it is the (relative) quality that determines whether or not
a particular variety is luxurious.
Figure 1 illustrates this feature graphically. The distributions of qualities and demand in-
tensities across varieties are drawn for four di¤erent levels of worldwide aggregate productivity
(0   < 1 < 2 < 3). When individuals are still poor (i.e., for a level of productivity
0  ), satisfying all basic needs constitutes their main goal, leading them to keep the quality
of all goods at the baseline level and setting accordingly equal demand intensities for all vari-
eties. As individuals become richer, some varieties for a level of productivity 1 2 (0; 2) 
and eventually all varieties for a level of productivity 3  2 are consumed in higher qual-
ity degrees. As a result, for those three levels of , a subset of varieties with v > 1 appears in the
Figure 1  Changes in the distribution of qualities and demand intensities
as aggregate productivity increases
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lower spectrum of the (unit) variety set. Additionally, the varieties whose quality degree is
relatively higher attract increasingly larger income shares, as given the preference specication in
(1) individuals tend to value high-quality commodities relatively more as they become wealthier.
This last point is formalised in the following corollary.
Corollary 1
Let # (v)  R v0 z dz. Then:
(i) If  <  : @# (v) =@ = 0, 8 v 2 V;
(ii) If    : @# (v) =@ > 0, 8 v 2 [0; 1).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Corollary 1 synthesizes the eventual non-homothetic behaviour of the demand schedules
implied by our model. In particular, whenever  < , demand schedules are homothetic across
varieties. However, when  lies above the threshold , income starts being spent in growing
proportion on lower-indexed varieties.
5 General Equilibrium in the World Economy
In Section 4, we have studied the optimal consumption choice of an individual from H, taking
the wages in H and in F, w and w, as exogenously given. (In Appendix B, we do the same for
the case of an individual from F.) These wages in turn determine the prices of all reproducible
commodities in the world economy through equation (3). Our former analysis has therefore
yielded only partial equilibrium results.
The present section computes the general equilibrium in this world economy. This requires
endogenising wages and, thereby, the prices of all reproducible commodities. Given that in a
general equilibrium only relative prices are determined, we henceforth take the wage in F as the
numeraire, by setting w = 1.
In order to disregard the e¤ects of heterogeneous population size in di¤erent countries, we
suppose that both H and F are inhabited by a continuum of individuals with identical mass,
which we normalise to one. (We explore the general equilibrium e¤ects of heterogenous popula-
tion size and growth later on in Section 6).
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A representative individual from H will then solve:
max
fqv ;vgv2V
U =
Z m
0
qv ln
 
v
a (v) q
(v)
v
!
dv +
Z 1
m
qv ln
 
vw
a (v) q(v)v
!
dv;
subject to:
Z
V
v dv = 1; and qv  1; 8v 2 V:
(8)
On the other hand, a representative individual from F solves:
max
fqv ;vgv2V
U =
Z m
0
qv ln
 
v
a (v) q
(v)
v w
!
dv +
Z 1
m
qv ln
 
v
a (v) q(v)v
!
dv;
subject to:
Z
V
v dv = 1; and qv  1; 8v 2 V:
(9)
The solution of (8) and (9) yields the demand functions of each variety v 2 V by H and F,
respectively. By using # (v)  R v0 z dz as dened in Corollary 1 and # (v)  R v0 zdz see
Corollary 1 (Foreign) in Appendix B we can write the equilibrium condition for the market of
goods produced in H as follows:
# (m)w + # (m) = w; (10)
where m is the marginal variety as dened by (4). Condition (10) essentially says that the
aggregate amount of income spent by the world in goods produced in H must be equal to the
aggregate income of H. This condition can also be understood as the equilibrium condition for
the labour market in H.14
The world economy general equilibrium is determined by (4), (8), (9), and (10). We will
henceforth focus our attention on the equilibrium values of w and m, and on how these two
variables respond to some simple comparative statics exercises.
Worldwide Uniform Aggregate Productivity Growth
In this subsection, we look at the impact of changes in  on the equilibrium values of w and m.
We can split the results in two di¤erent cases.
Subsistence economies:   
From our previous discussion, we can observe that when   , the optimal demand intensities
are set at v = 

v = 1 for all v 2 V. This result in turn implies that # (m) = # (m) = m.
14Because of the WalrasLaw, an analogous condition can be derived for the equilibrium in the labour market
in F.
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Therefore, (10) simplies to:
w = m= (1 m) : (11)
Combining then (4) with (11), leads to m= (1 m) = A (m), from where it follows that, for all
  , in equilibrium: w = 1 and m = 0:5. That is, H and F exhibit the same level of income,
and the pattern of regional specialisation is accordingly dictated by the naturalcomparative
advantage of each country without relative-wage bias (i.e., the comparative advantage that
derives purely from the heterogeneity in the technological structure implied by Assumption
1).15
Modern economies:  > 
When aggregate productivity is su¢ ciently high, the income equality between H and F no longer
holds. In particular, as  rises above the threshold , the terms of trade start moving in favour
of H, and thus H becomes relatively richer than F. Furthermore, the income disparity between
H and F increases as  keeps rising.
Proposition 2
Suppose Assumption 1 holds. In addition, suppose  > : Then, in equilibrium:
(i) w > 1 and m < 0:5.
(ii) @w=@ > 0 and @m=@ < 0:
Proof.
Part (i). When  > , from Corollary 1 it follows that #(m) > m and #(m) > m. As a result,
by using (10), we can obtain:
w =
#(m)
1  #(m) >
m
1 m: (12)
Combining next (12) with (4), and recalling Assumption 1 leads to:
A(m) =
#(m)
1  #(m) >
m
1 m , m < 0:5.
Finally, since m < 0:5, (4) implies that w > 1:
15Notice that, since w = 1 for all   , in fact  =  (that is, the threshold on  that divides a subsistence-
economy from a modern economy happens to be the same for both H and F). As a consequence, we can refer to
both thresholds simply as .
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Part (ii). Next, to study how w and m vary as  keeps rising above , we di¤erentiate the
equilibrium conditions (4) and (10). This leads to:
@w
@
= A0(m)
@m
@
(13)
and
(wm + 

m)
@m
@
+

w
@#(m)
@w
+ #(m) +
@#(m)
@w

@w
@
+

@#(m)
@
+
@#(m)
@

=
@w
@
; (14)
where the rst term in (14) uses the fact that @#(m)=@m = m and @#
(m)=@m = m. Plugging
(13) into (14), we can obtain:
@m
@
=
@#(m)=@+ @#(m)=@
[1  #(m)  w @#(m)=@w   @#(m)=@w]A0(m)  (wm + m)
: (15)
For determining the sign of (15), we can use the following two results: rst, Corollary 1 states
that both @#(m)=@ > 0 and @#(m)=@ > 0; second, as shown in Appendix D, @#(m)=@w  0
and @#(m)=@w < 0. Therefore, since 1   #(m) > 0 and A0(m) < 0, then @m=@ < 0 obtains
from the right-hand side of (15). Finally, from (13) it then follows that @w=@ > 0.
Proposition 2 shows that as the worldwide productivity parameter, , increases, the income
in H eventually begins diverging away from the income in F. The reason for the divergence rests
on the fact that H enjoys a comparative advantage in lower-indexed varieties, which tend to
be consumed in relatively higher quality levels and display accordingly higher income demand
elasticity. As a consequence, as the world economy grows uniformly above , aggregate world
expenditure shifts towards the set of commodities produced by H. The ensuing excess demand
for commodities produced in H causes excess labour demand in H and w thus goes up. In turn,
as w rises, the marginal variety moves to the left (i.e., m falls), and some of the varieties that
used to be produced by H start being now produced by F, restoring the equilibrium in the labour
markets.
The endogenous emergence of income disparities in the absence of absolute advantages in
this two-country world economy represents the main result and novelty of our paper. Initially, H
and F display the same level of income per head. Although sectorial productivities di¤er across
the two countries and govern the patterns of regional specialisation, their heterogeneity is not
enough to warrant income disparities between H and F. This is because at low levels of worldwide
aggregate productivity the willingness to pay for high-quality commodities is not large enough
for tilting aggregate demand disproportionally towards the varieties produced by H. However,
in a context where worldwide aggregate productivity rises leading to higher incomes in both H
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and F, varieties exhibiting larger scope for quality upgrading become increasingly appreciated
by the consumer and, thus, start absorbing larger budget shares. Within a general equilibrium
framework, this mechanism implies that aggregate demand shifts towards H, inducing faster
income growth in H relative to F, via the secular tendency to improve Hs terms of trade.
6 Some Other Comparative Statics Exercises
This subsection briey studies the results of two other comparative statics experiments com-
monly explored by the previous literature on international trade with non-homothetic prefer-
ences. Firstly, we analyse the e¤ects of uneven population growth across countries, and show
that the country in which population grows faster tends to experience a decline in its terms of
trade and relative income. Secondly, we look at the case of income inequality within countries,
and show that inequality within countries tends to improve the terms of trade and the relative
income of the economy that specialises in varieties that display higher income demand elasticity.
6.1 Introducing Uneven Population Growth
So far we have assumed that each country is identical regarding all relevant features for our
model. In this subsection we let the population size in F di¤er from that in H. Let the total
mass of individuals in F equal L > 1. Thus, the labour market equilibrium condition in H will
be given by:
#(m)w + L#(m) = w: (16)
Visual inspection on (16) and (10) combined with (4)immediately implies that the equilibrium
value of w that is delivered by (16) will be strictly larger than that yielded by (10). In particular,
in equilibrium w > 1, regardless of the value of . The next proposition shows that this source
of income divergence between F and H is stronger the larger the value of L.
Proposition 3
The relative wage in H is increasing in the size of the population in F.
Proof. Totally di¤erentiating (16), and bearing in mind that, from (4), @w=@L = A0(m) (@m=@L)
must hold in equilibrium, leads to:
@w
@L
=
w
L
1  #(m)h
1  #(m)  w @#(m)@w   L@#
(m)
@w   1A0(m) (mw + mL)
i > 0: (17)
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where the positive in (17) obtains from @#(m)=@w  0, @#(m)=@w  0, and A0(m) < 0.
When the population in F increases, the relative wage w must go up so as to accommodate
the excess supply of labour in F. More precisely, a larger L requires more goods to be produced
by F in order to keep full employment there; this is accomplished by letting w go up, which
in turn shifts the marginal variety m to the left, helping restore the equilibrium in the labour
markets.
The result that the H relative wage rises as the relative population of F increases is in
line with the models in Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991) and Matsuyama (2000).
However, some interesting di¤erences are also present. In Flam-Helpman and Stokey, although
the optimal bundle of goods traded in the market changes, no new goods actually appear in
the world economy as w rises due to uneven population growth in the world. In Matsuyama,
new goods start being produced in the country whose population grows slower (i.e., in H). In
our model, this feature is present too. Furthermore, new goods start being produced also by F.
More precisely, as individuals in H become richer when w increases, they will start demanding
higher qualities for the varieties produced in F, as well as for those produced domestically. This
last result is absent in Matsuyama, where F does not begin producing new goods, but only takes
on the production of (some) varieties that are abandoned by H as w increases.16
In our model, the equilibrium adjustments triggered by heterogeneity in population growth
rates across countries generates thus two types of product cycle phenomena. First, like in Mat-
suyama, we have an international product cycle phenomenon involving both countries simulta-
neously, similar to those discussed by Linder (1961) and Vernon (1966), where over time the
production of lower-quality goods moves from H to F, while H specialises in more sophisticated
higher-quality goods. The second phenomenon, which is novel to our model, occurs within each
variety and could be called regional product cycle, as it involves single countries individually:
rising income in H leads both H and F to abandon the manufacturing of lower-quality goods
and replace them with the production of goods of higher quality standards.
16For example, our model then predicts that Africa will start to produce organic bananas to sell in Europe,
as increasingly richer European consumers begin desiring to purchase higher-quality fruit products. This type
of adjustment in the production structure of the economies whose population grows faster and relative income
declines is absent in papers cited above in the main text.
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6.2 Introducing Income Inequality within each Country
In this subsection we examine the general equilibrium consequences of introducing some degree
of income heterogeneity within countries.
To keep the analysis short and concise, we introduce income inequality only in F (H), while
we maintain the assumption that the population in H (F) is homogeneous. In particular, we
assume that F (H) is inhabited by two types of individuals: p and r, where the p stands for poor
and r stands for rich. Each sub-group of foreigners has mass equal to 0:5. A type p is endowed
with 1    units of e¤ective labour, while a type r is endowed with 1 +  units of it; where
 2 (0; 1). On the other hand, in H (F) everyone is endowed with 1 unit of e¤ective labour.
Introducing income inequality in the model leads to interesting results when the types p are
so poor that, in equilibrium, they consume all varieties at the baseline quality level, whereas
in contrast the types r can a¤ord consuming some of the varieties strictly above that level. To
focus on such case, we accordingly set  = .
Proposition 4
Suppose that the population in F (H) is split in two groups, p and r, of equal mass. Individuals
in p are endowed with 1   units of e¤ective labour and individuals in r are endowed with 1 + 
units of it, where  2 (0; 1). The population in H (F) is homogeneously endowed with one unit
of e¤ective labour. Additionally, suppose that  = . Then, in equilibrium:
(i) w > 1 and m < 0:5.
(ii) @w=@ > 0 and @m=@ < 0:
Proof. See Appendix C.
When  = , introducing income inequality in F raises the relative wage in H. This is owing to
the non-homotheticity of the demand schedules of the rich foreigners. More precisely, increasing
 transfers income from the poor foreigners, who spend a fraction m of it in goods from H, to
the rich foreigners, who spend a fraction #r(m) > m of their income on those commodities. As
a result, aggregate demand for goods produced in H rises leading to higher w.
Similarly, we can observe that incorporating inequality in H carries similar consequences on
w and m. This is the case because the rich locals would tend to shift aggregate demand towards
the goods produced in H, exactly the same shift induced by the presence of rich foreigners.
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7 Conclusion
We have proposed a model of international trade with non-homothetic preferences based on
comparative advantages that are unrelated to the stage in the process of development in which
countries are. This last feature represents the main point of departure with respect to the past
literature on North-South trade, where comparative advantages originate from the fact that
some countries (the North) have historically accumulated larger amounts of capital than others
(the South).
The key novel nding of our model is observing that even when no single country enjoys
a clear absolute advantage over any other country and productivity changes are uniform and
identical in all countries, international trade may still be the source of income divergence in
the world economy. In particular, countriesincomes will diverge when comparative advantages
induce patterns of specialisation that, although optimal for each country at early stages in
the process of development, do not o¤er the same scope for improvements in terms of quality
upgrading of nal products in the long run.
Our model also points out that heterogeneity in population growth rates across countries
generates two distinct types of product cycle phenomena. The rst is an international product
cycle phenomenon à la Linder-Vernon, where over time one economy takes on the production of
goods previously produced by another economy. The second which is novel to our model is
a regional product cycle that occurs within each variety and within each economy: rising income
in one particular economy makes all economies engage in the production of goods of higher
quality standards (so as to satisfy the increasing demand for high qualities by the economy that
is becoming wealthier).
In this paper, we have focused on illustrating how our theory may shed light on historical
cases where comparative advantages emerged as a result of heterogeneous geographical condi-
tions. Other issues, including what determines the relative successes or failures of economies
with similar comparative advantages, and why richer countries tend to trade among themselves
more than countries with substantial income disparities do, are the subject of ongoing research.
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Appendices
A First-Order Conditions for Consumption Choice in H
The optimisation problem in (6) yields the following rst-order conditions (where  represents
the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint and fvgv2V denote those associated
to the constraints fqv  1gv2V):
ln
 
vw
 1 (v) q(v)v
!
   (v) + v = 0; 8v 2 V; (18)
qv
v
   = 0; 8v 2 V; (19)
qv   1  0; v  0; and v (qv   1) = 0; 8v 2 V; (20)
1 
Z
V
v dv = 0: (21)
From (19), it follows that v = qv=. Then, replacing this last expression into (21) leads toR
V qz dz = , from where the condition (7) immediately obtains by using again (19).
By using the condition (7), we can rewrite (18) as:
v =  (v) + ln [ (v) =w]  ln+ lnQ+ [ (v)  1] ln qv: (22)
The expression in (22) will be used in many of the following proofs.
B Optimal Consumption Choice in F
Bearing in mind Assumption 1, we can write down the optimisation problem faced by a repre-
sentative individual from F as follows:
max
fxvqg(v;q)2VQ
U =
Z
V
ln
Z
Q
max

xvq;
 
xvq
q	
dq

dv;
subject to:
R
V 

vdv = 1;
v = (w)
 1
Z
Q
pvqx

vqdq; 8v 2 V;
pvq = 
 1q(v) (v) ; 8 (v; q) 2 VQ:
Lemma 1 holds for xvq in a similar fashion as for xvq. Hence, we can re-state the problem
specied above in terms of qv and 

v, as it was previously done for H (where q

v now denotes
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the quality of variety v consumed, in the optimum, in F). This way, we can obtain the following
rst-order conditions, which constitute the analogous versions for F of (7) and (22), respectively:
v =
qvR
V q

z dz
; 8v 2 V; (23)
v =  (v) + ln [ (v) =w
]  ln+ lnQ + [ (v)  1] ln qv : (24)
Given the rst-order conditions in (23) and (24), all the ensuing results found in Section 4 fol-
low through in qualitative terms. In particular, we can derive functions fqvgv2V and fvgv2V dis-
playing identical qualitative properties as their counterparts in H, that is fqvgv2V and fvgv2V,
in terms of Lemmas 2 - 4 and Proposition 1. Furthermore, we can similarly nd the thresh-
old  for the worldwide aggregate-productivity parameter, which splits F in the regimes of
subsistence-economy and modern-economy ; both exhibiting analogous properties as described
for H.17 Finally, likewise for H in Corollary 1, for F the following holds:
Corollary 2
Let # (v)  R v0 z dz. Then:
(i) If  <  : @# (v) =@ = 0, 8 v 2 V;
(ii) If    : @# (v) =@ > 0, 8 v 2 [0; 1).
C Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Part (i). First, notice that utility is given by an additive function over logarithms. Optimization
can thus be split in two stages: (a) maximise U with respect to the logarithms; (b) maximise
those logarithms with respect to xvq. About (b), notice that the logarithms are dened on the
integral over convex functions of xvq, and therefore are themselves convex functions. It follows
that (b) optimally requires corner solutions, so the result claimed obtains.
Part (ii). The proof follows immediately from noting that, for all v 2 V, utility derived from
consuming xvq 2 (0; 1] is independent of the quality-index q, while according to (3) the price of
commodity (v; q) 2 VQ is strictly increasing along the quality space.
Proof of Lemma 2.
17From Section 5, it is straightforward to observe that, given Assumption 1,  = .
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First, suppose qv < qv. Since qv  1, then qv > 1, hence (22) paired with (20) yield:  (v) +
ln [ (v) =w]  ln (=Q)  0, while  (v) + ln [ (v) =w]  ln (=Q) + [ (v)  1] ln qv = 0. Thus:
 (v) + ln (v)   (v) + ln (v) + [ (v)  1] ln qv:
This last equality in turn leads to:
[ (v)   (v)] + ln [ (v) = (v)] + [ (v)  1] ln qv  0;
which cannot possibly hold if qv > 1, as its left-hand side would then be strictly positive.
Therefore, it must necessarily be the case that qv  qv.
Next, suppose qv = qv > 1. In this case, (22) in conjunction with (20) yield:
 (v) + ln (v) + [ (v)  1] ln qv =  (v) + ln (v) + [ (v)  1] ln qv = 0:
This last equality in turn leads to:
  [ (v)   (v)] (1 + ln qv) = ln [ (v) = (v)] :
However, this last equality cannot possibly hold since its right-hand side is strictly positive,
while the left-hand side is negative. As a result, qv > qv must necessarily hold when qv > 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.
In order to prove this lemma it proves convenient to state rst the following result:
Claim 1 The optimal quality qv of any variety v 2 V can be written as follows:
qv = max
n
0;v (q0)
0;v ; 1
o
; (25)
where:
0;v 
"
e(0) (0)
e(v) (v)
# 1
(v) 1
> 0, and 0;v   (0)  1
 (v)  1 > 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Next, notice that, from (25), @0;v (v) =@v < 0 and @0;v (v) =@v < 0 since a0 (v)  0 and
0 (v) > 0, hence the set L  V comprises the lower-indexed varieties in V, with ~v() represent-
ing its upper bound.
Part (i). When  2 (0; ), conditions stipulated in (20) and (22) applied on v = 0 entail that:
q0 = 1 and 0 > 0. As a result, from Lemma 2 it follows that qv = 1, 8v 2 V: Therefore, since
a0 (v)  0 and 0 (v) > 0, again from (22), v > 0 for all v 2 V obtains, and thus L = ;:
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Part (ii). Note that (22) applied on v = 0, in conjunction Lemma 2, implies that when  = ,
then 0 = 0 and q0 = 1. Then, Lemma 2 implies Q = 1. Using these results in (22) yields:
v =  (v)+ln [ (v) =w]  ln, implying that v > 0 for all v 2 (0; 1]. As a result, the set L = 0,
meaning that ~v() = 0.
Claim 2 If ~v() < 1, then q~v() = 1.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Given Claim 2 and Lemma 2, the aggregate quality index can be written as follows: Q =
1   ~v() + R ~v()0 qv dv. Furthermore, observe that, whenever ~v() < 1, ln (=Q) =  (~v()) +
ln [ (~v()) =w] must hold in equilibrium. This last condition yields, after some simple alge-
bra, Q = w exp [  (~v)] = (~v). In addition to that, because of Lemma 2, in equilibrium,
[ (v)  1] ln qv = ln (=Q)    (v)   ln [ (v) =w] must hold for any v  ~v(). By using the
former in the latter, after some algebra, we may obtain:
qv = qv (~v()) 

 (~v())
 (v)
 1
(v) 1
exp

 (~v())   (v)
 (v)  1

, 8 v 2 [0; ~v()]: (26)
In equilibrium, it must be the case that:
w exp [  (~v())] =a (~v()) = 1  ~v() +
Z ~v()
0
qv (~v()) dv; (27)
where the right hand-side of (27) uses (26). Computing the total di¤erentiation of (27), yields
after some algebra:18
Q

d =

0 (~v())
 (~v())
+ 0 (~v())
"
Q+
Z ~v()
0
qv
 (v)  1dv
#
d~v;
leading nally to:
d~v
d
=
"

Q

0 (~v())
 (~v())
+ 0 (~v())
 
1  ~v() +
Z ~v()
0
 (v)
 (v)  1qvdv
!# 1
> 0:
where the last inequality follows from the properties of the functions  () and  ()
Proof of Lemma 4.
Part (i). Proof follows immediately from noting that Lemma 3 implies that, whenever  2
18One subtle caveat applies here. Even if both wa(v) and wa(v) are di¤erentiable functions over the whole
domain of v, the envelope function (v) will not necessarily be so. In particular, (v) may not be di¤erentiable
at the point v = m: As a result, if ~v = m, 0(~v) may not exist. In the very specic case where this anomaly
holds, we take that 0(v) = lim
4v!0+
4(v)
4v .
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(0; ), qv = 1 must hold for all v 2 V. Thus, whenever  2 (0; ), @qv=@ = 0 for all v 2 V.
Part (ii.a). Di¤erentiating (25), computed for any v 2 L, with respect to  yields:
dqv
d
=
 (0)  1
 (v)  1
"
e(0) (0)
e(v) (v)
# 1
(v) 1
(q0)
(0) (v)
(v) 1 dq0
d
; 8v 2 L:
Using again (25), the equation above can be written:
dqv
d
=
 (0)  1
 (v)  1
qv
q0
dq0
d
; 8v 2 L: (28)
(Since  () > 1, notice that dqv=d and dq0=d must then share the same sign, for all v 2 L).
Given that Q = 1  ~v() + R ~v()0 qz dz, it follows that:
dQ
d
=
Z ~v()
0
dqz
d
dz =
1
q0
 Z ~v()
0
 (0)  1
 (z)  1qzdz
!
dq0
d
:
Applying (22) to v = 0 when 0 = 0 yields: q0 =

a (0) e(0)Q
  1
(0) 1 
1
(0) 1 . Thus:
dq0
d
=
q0
 (0)  1
Q

 
1  ~v +
Z ~v()
0
 (z)
 (z)  1 qz dz
! 1
> 0:
Therefore, from (28) it follows that dqv=d > 0; 8v 2 L must also hold.
Part (ii.b). Since qv = 1 must hold for all v =2 L. Proof is analogous to that of Part (i) of this
Proposition.
Part (ii.c). Part (ii.a) and (ii.b) of this Proposition, taken together, imply that dqv=d =
dqv=d = 0 if v; v =2 L, and dqv=d > dqv=d = 0 if v 2 L and v =2 L. For v; v 2 L, such that
v < v, (28) leads to:
dqv
d
=
 (0)  1
 (v)  1
qv
q0
dq0
d
>
 (0)  1
 (v)  1
qv
q0
dq0
d
=
dqv
d
;
since by assumption  (v) <  (v) and, from Lemma 2, qv > qv.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Firstly, considering the denition of average quality, taking logarithms and di¤erentiating (7)
with respect to  yields: (dv=d) =v = (dqv=d) =qv   (dQ=d) =Q. Using (28), we can write:
dqv
d
1
qv
=
 (0)  1
 (v)  1
dq0
d
1
q0
>
 (0)  1
 (v)  1
dq0
d
1
q0
=
dqv
d
1
qv
:
Hence:
dv
d
1
v
>
dv
d
1
v
: (29)
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Part (i). Using (29), the claim trivially follows by noting that, from Lemma 2 in conjunction
with (7), v > v must always hold.
Part (ii). Suppose instead that @v=@ > 0 when @v=@  0. Using (29), it follows that:
dv
d
<
v
v
dv
d
 0;
which contradicts the fact that @v=@ > 0 when @v=@  0. As a result, if v =2 J, then
@v=@  0 must hold.
Proof of Corollary 1.
Preliminarily, recall
R
z2V z dz = 1, which implies
R 1
0 (@z=@) dz = 0:
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Part (i). Claim immediately follows since, whenever  < ; @z=@ = 0 for all z 2 V.
Part (ii). Note rst that when   , the set J 6= ;. As a result, from Proposition 1, Part (i), it
follows that
R v
0 (@z=@) dz >
R 1
v (@z=@) dz. Then, since
R v
0 (@z=@) dz+
R 1
v (@z=@) dz = 0,
we must necessarily have that
R v
0 (@z=@) dz > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that the heterogeneity in the e¤ective labour endowments
is in country F.
Part (i). When  = , in F, #p(m) = m and #

r(m) > m; where #

j (m) denotes the fraction
of income that types j 2 fp; rg spend on varieties belonging to [0;m). On the other hand, in
H, #(m) = m; since when  =  all individuals from H optimally consume all varieties at the
baseline level.20 As a result, from (10), the equilibrium condition in the labour market in H
reads as follows:
mw + 12 [(1  )m+ (1 + )#r(m)] = w: (30)
From (30), (4) and Assumption 1, since #r(m) > m, it immediately follows that w > 1, which
in turn implies m < 0:5.
Part (ii). Totally di¤erentiating (30), and using the fact that, from (4), @w=@ = A0(m) (@m=@)
must be veried in equilibrium, leads to:
@w
@
=
(1 + ) (@#r=@) + (#

r(m) m)
2(1 m)  (1 + ) (@#r=@w) 

2w + (1  ) + (1 + )r;m

=A0(m)
> 0. (31)
19Note that it is then trivial to observe that @#(1)=@ = 0, 8 > 0.
20Recall from Lemma 3 that   a (0) exp [ (0)], which is independent of w=w.
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The positive sign in (31) stems from the fact that @#r(m)=@ > 0, @#

r(m)=@w < 0, and
A0(m) < 0.
An analogous proof holds for the case in which the heterogeneity in the e¤ective labour endow-
ments is in country H. See Appendix C.
D Auxiliary Derivations and Proofs
Proof of Claim 1
Recall that qv = 1, 8v =2 L. For all other varieties, (22) in conjunction with (20) yield:
 (v) + ln (v) + [ (v)  1] ln qv =  (0) + ln (0) + [ (0)  1] ln q0; 8v 2 L:
Isolating [ (v)  1] ln qv, and applying exponentials to both sides gives:
(qv)
(v) 1 =
e(0)
e(v)
(0)
 (v)
(q0)
(0) 1 ; 8v 2 L:
Finally, raising both sides to the power [ (v)  1] 1, and considering Lemma 2, (25) obtains.
Proof of Claim 2
By denition of L, ~v() = 0. Thus, the condition (22) applied on ~v() yields:
 (~v()) + ln [ (~v()) =w]  ln+ lnQ =   [ (~v())  1] ln q~v() (32)
Suppose now that q~v() > 1, and take some " 2 (0; 1   ~v()]. Then, since v = ~v() + " =2 L, it
must be the case that:
 (~v() + ") + ln [ (~v() + ") =w]  ln+ lnQ = ~v()+": (33)
Then, by continuity of  () and  (), and using the result in (32), we must have:
lim
"!0
f (~v() + ") + ln [ (~v() + ") =w]  ln+ lnQg =   [ (~v())  1] ln q~v() < 0:
Hence, q~v() > 1 cannot possibly hold when ~v() < 1 as it would imply that ~v()+" < 0 in (33)
for "! 0, violating (20).
Proof of @#(m)=@w  0.
Suppose rst that ~v < m. Then, L  [0;m). Di¤erentiating (22) with respect to w yields:
 (v)  1
qv
@qv
@w
+
1
Q
@Q
@w
= 0; 8v 2 L: (34)
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Furthermore, from (25) it follows that:
@qv
@w
=
 (0)  1
 (v)  1
qv
q0
@q0
@w
; 8v 2 L: (35)
Since @Q=@w =
R ~v
0 (@qz=@w) dz, combining (34) and (35) yields:
1  ~v +
Z ~v
0
 (z)
 (z)  1qzdz

 (0)  1
q0
1
Q
@q0
@w
= 0 ) @q0
@w
= 0;
Therefore, using again (35), @qv=@w = 0 for all v 2 [0; ~v] obtains. In addition, because of Lemma
2, it must thus be the case that @qv=@w = 0 holds as well for all v 2 (~v; 1]. Finally, recalling (7)
it then follows that @v=@w = 0 for all v 2 V, which in turn implies that @# (m) =@w = 0.
Suppose now that ~v  m. Di¤erentiating (22) with respect to w now yields:
 (v)  1
qv
@qv
@w
+
1
Q
@Q
@w
=
8<: 0; 8v 2 [0;m)1=w; 8v 2 [m; ~v] (36)
From (36) it follows that a necessary condition for @# (m) =@w > 0 to hold is that @Q=@w < 0.21
However, (36) means that if @Q=@w < 0, then @qv=@w > 0 should hold for all v 2 [m; ~v]. If
~v = 1; it must be straightforward to observe that @Q=@w < 0 cannot thus hold. Alternatively, if
~v < 1, then @Q=@w < 0 would require that @qv=@w < 0 prevails for some v 2 (~v; 1] which is not
feasible either since it would lead to violating the constraint qv  1. As a result, @Q=@w  0
must hold, which in turn implies @# (m) =@w  0.
Proof of @# (m) =@w < 0.
Suppose rst that ~v < m. Then, L [0;m). Di¤erentiating (22) adjusted for representing
an individual from F with respect to w yields:
 (v)  1
qv
@qv
@w
+
1
Q
@Q
@w
=   1
w
; 8v 2 L: (37)
In addition, from (25) it follows that:
@qv
@w
=
 (0)  1
 (v)  1
qv
q0
@q0
@w
; 8v 2 L: (38)
Combining (37) and (38) leads to: 
1  ~v +
Z ~v
0
 (z)
 (z)  1qzdz
!
 (0)  1
q0
1
Q
@q0
@w
=   1
w
) @q

0
@w
< 0:
21Otherwise, if @Q=@w  0, (36) would imply that @qv=@w  0 for all v 2 [0;m). Recalling (7), it is then
straightforward to observe that @Q=@w  0 would mean @v=@w  0 for all v 2 [0;m), which in turn leads to
@# (m) =@m  0.
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Hence, using again (38), @qv=@w < 0 for all v 2 [0; ~v] obtains, which in turn implies @Q=@w <
0. Next, since for all v  ~v the constraint qv  1 is binding, it must be the case that @qv=@w  0,
8v 2 (~v; 1]. As a result, because of (7), @v=@w > 0 for all v 2 [m; 1] follows, which in turn
implies @# (m) =@w < 0.
Suppose now ~v  m. Di¤erentiating (22) with respect to w now yields:
 (v)  1
qv
@qv
@w
+
1
Q
@Q
@w
=
8<:  1=w; 8v 2 [0;m)0; 8v 2 [m; ~v] (39)
Suppose @Q=@w  0. From (39) it follows that @qv=@w < 0 for all v 2 [0; ~v). Furthermore,
Lemma 2 then implies that @qv=@w  0 for all v 2 [~v; 1]; as a result, @Q=@w < 0 must
necessarily hold. Now, notice that if @Q=@w < 0, then (39) implies @qv=@w > 0 for all v 2
[m; ~v]. Moreover, in case ~v < 1, since 8v 2 (~v; 1] the constraint qv  1 is binding, @qv=@w  0
must necessarily hold for all v 2 (~v; 1]. As a result, if @Q=@w < 0, then @v=@w > 0 for all
v 2 [m; 1], which in turn leads to @# (m) =@w < 0.
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